

CONSEQUENCES OF THE RUSSIAN INVASION FOR UKRAINIAN SOCIETY: MIGRATION, ITS EXTENT, WAYS TO OVERCOME

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Shepel T. V. Consequences of the Russian Invasion for Ukrainian Society: Migration, Its Extent, Ways to Overcome

The article considers the main aspects of a previously unknown phenomenon in Ukrainian society – the multi-million number of refugees during the full-scale Russian invasion of Ukraine. The reasons that directly influenced the migration of Ukrainians are identified. The extent of destruction of Ukrainian cities as a result of terrorist attacks, which provoked a powerful migration wave, is determined. An analysis of the most damaged objects of social infrastructure, enterprises, residential buildings, medical and educational institutions, in particular in Donbas and the Azov region, is carried out. The cities of the aggressor country hosting the deported people from the seized parts of regions of Ukraine are named. In this respect, it cannot be determined for certain which category of Ukrainians left voluntarily and which under duress. The countries of the European Union chosen by Ukrainians for residence, citizenship or temporary asylum are studied. It is determined that in the overwhelming majority the choice of destination country was determined by proximity to the homeland. The gender and age category of the displaced persons, marital status, etc. are analyzed. The critically young age of Ukrainian refugees, the dynamics of the outflow of the reproductive category of the population representing the intellect of the State are determined. The socioeconomic problems (loss of housing, divorces, drain of economically active population, aging of the nation, undermining of territories, ecological catastrophe, falling GDP, etc.) that will befall Ukraine in the post-war period are emphasized. It is proved that economic factors can cause another wave of economic migration, which must be prevented today. It is revealed that for the return of migrants important are the level of unemployment, incomes of the population, prospects for economic growth, economic recovery. The priorities and directions of the State policy for the return of Ukrainian citizens, the development of destroyed territories and the protection of Ukrainians situated on the border with Russia and Belarus are determined.

Keywords: migration, forced migration, migration movement, refugees, Russian-Ukrainian war, military aggression.

Fig.: 11. **Tabl.:** 2. **Bibl.:** 26.

Shepel Tetiana V. – PhD (Economics), Associate Professor, Associate Professor of the Department of Entrepreneurship and Marketing, Ivano-Frankivsk National Technical University of Oil and Gas (15 Karpatska Str., Ivano-Frankivsk, 76019, Ukraine)

E-mail: tetianaksau@gmail.com

ORCID: <https://orcid.org/0000-0001-5286-3754>

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Шепель Т. В. Наслідки російського вторгнення для українського суспільства: міграція, масштаб, шляхи подолання

У статті розглянуто головні аспекти невідомого раніше в українському суспільстві феномену – багатомільйонної чисельності біженців під час повномасштабного російського вторгнення на територію України. Виявлено причини, які безпосередньо вплинули на міграцію українців. Визначено масштаби руйнування українських міст унаслідок терористичного нападу, що й спровокувало потужну міграційну хвилю. Проведено аналіз найбільш зруйнованих об'єктів соціальної інфраструктури, підприємств, житлових будинків, медичних та освітніх закладів, зокрема на Донбасі та Приазов'ї. Представлено міста країни-агресора для депортованого населення з областей України, які знаходилися під окупацією. При цьому достеменно не визначено, яка категорія українців виїхала добровільно, а яка під примусом. Досліджено країни Європейського Союзу, обрані українцями для проживання, отримання громадянства або тимчасового притулку. Визначено, що в переважній більшості вибір країни призначення обумовлювався близькістю до батьківщини. Проаналізовано статево-вікову категорію вимушених переселенців, сімейний стан тощо. Визначено критично молодий вік українських біженців, динаміку відтоку репродуктивної категорії населення та інтелекту держави. Наголошено на соціально-економічних проблемах (втрата житла, розлучення, втрата економічно активного населення, старіння нації, мінуння територій, екологічна катастрофа, падіння ВВП тощо), які спіткують Україну в післявоєнний період. Доведено, що економічні чинники можуть зумовити іншу хвилю економічної міграції, якій треба запобігти вже сьогодні. Виявлено, що важливими для повернення мігрантів є рівень безробіття, доходи населення, перспективи економічного зростання, відбудови економіки. Обумовлено пріоритети та визначено напрями державної політики для повернення українських громадян, розвитку зруйнованих територій і захист українців на кордоні з Росією та Білоруссю.

Ключові слова: міграція, вимушена міграція, міграційний рух, біженці, російсько-українська війна, військова агресія.

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Шепель Тетяна Володимирівна – кандидат економічних наук, доцент, доцент кафедри підприємництва і маркетингу, Івано-Франківський національний технічний університет нафти і газу (вул. Карпатська, 15, Івано-Франківськ, 76019, Україна)

E-mail: tetianaksau@gmail.com

ORCID: <https://orcid.org/0000-0001-5286-3754>

The preconditions for tension in relations between the two neighboring countries – Ukraine and Russia – have deep historical roots. The absorption of Ukraine, its material and human resources is one of the key prerequisites for the deployment of the Russian

project. Ukrainians and Russians did not always have one way and, as result, different cultures, languages, and values were formed. After the collapse of the Soviet Union, when both former Soviet republics became separate countries, the political difference added. Kyiv followed

the path of Western democracies, with a regular change of the government, that Moscow did not approve of.

Violating the norms and principles of international law, bilateral and multilateral agreements, the eastern neighbor has annexed the Autonomous Republic of Crimea, has occupied certain areas of Donetsk and Luhansk regions. After nine years of resistance and recognition of the independence of the illegitimate formations of the «DPR», «LPR», and the territory of Donetsk and Luhansk regions not yet controlled by separatists, the aggressor country carried out a full-scale invasion of the territory of Ukraine.

The war unleashed by the eastern neighbor has led to the destruction of critical and social infrastructure, deaths and injuries of civilians in Kherson, Kyiv, Zaporizhzhia, Kharkiv, Donetsk, Luhansk, Chernihiv and other regions. The treacherous aggression on the territory of Ukraine has led to mass migration of the population and the emergence of a previously unknown phenomenon in Ukrainian society – multi-million forced migrants, refugees, displaced persons, internally displaced persons, asylum seekers [1].

For the citizens of Ukraine, the aggression of the eastern neighbor was a shock. After leaving their homes and saving own lives, they had to learn to live anew, adapting to the new environment.

Many scientific works by both domestic and foreign experts have been devoted to the problems of migration processes. The study of all aspects of migration policy during the Russian full-scale invasion has become a subject of debate for a number of scholars: O. Hryshnova, L. Filipchuk, N. Lomonosova, Y. Kabanets; O. Syrбу, E. Libanova, O. Malynovska, D. Kirby and others.

The *purpose* of the study is to analyze the migration flows of Ukrainians during the full-scale invasion of Russia.

The research materials were based on data from the UNHCR, Cedos think tank, current regulations and legislation on refugees, and scientific literature by economists on migration issues. The study used appropriate methods of economic research, i. e.: analysis, synthesis, generalization, statistical analysis, and comparison.

The morning of February 24, 2022 turned over the consciousness of Ukrainian citizens. Russia's full-scale war was a great social upheaval. It affected the emotional state, everyday life, public opinion, interpersonal relations, socioeconomic situation, employment, and social activity. The willingness to abandon their usual life and flee in search of a safe place to live came not easy for many citizens. This decision was influenced by many factors: from difficult conditions of departure to the provision of their own housing and financial capabilities of Ukrainian families. The extent of these changes has become unprecedented for both Ukraine and Europe for the coming decades.

The Regional Refugee Response Plan brought together national authorities, a UN agency, non-governmental organizations, and civil society organizations that focused on supporting and ensuring the inclusion of refugees with full access to their rights, in accordance with international standards.

Russia's invasion is currently the most significant, but not the only reason for Ukrainian migration. Other possible motivations could be political instability; racial discrimination; dissatisfaction with the country's legislation and political system; shadow economy; low social security; scale of corruption, etc.

The Economic Strategy Center has divided Ukrainian migrants into four categories. (Fig. 1) [2]

First of all, Ukrainian displaced persons sought safety in Europe. The EU, in turn, granted them the right to live and work in all 27 countries for 3 years. Thanks to the unconditional support of foreigners, citizens of Ukraine currently have a wide range of opportunities abroad: language courses at the expense of the host country; social benefits; medical care; access to school education [3].

During the first month of the full-scale war, millions of Ukrainians crossed the borders of neighboring countries. The largest migration movement was observed from February 27 to March 9, 2022. In the first month of the invasion alone, 1.649.088 people or 3.8% of Ukraine's population left the country. Every day, more than 150.000 people fled the war, leaving their native land. A record-setting figure was achieved on March 6, when 210.526 citizens crossed the State border [4; 5] (Fig. 2).

Poland, which has become a leading country in the temporary protection of Ukrainians, has gained access to the EU labor markets and opportunities for social integration. During the 9 months of the war, Poland sheltered about 1.5 million Ukrainians (31%). Germany, in turn – 1 million people (21%); Czech Republic – 455.700 persons (9%); Italy – 171.500 persons (3%); Spain – 150.400 persons (3%); Great Britain – 141.500 persons (3%); Baltic States – 170.900 persons (3%); France – 118.900 persons (1%); Slovakia – 99.300 persons (2%); Moldova – 95.400 persons (2%); Romania – 87.800 persons (2%); the Netherlands – 79.200 persons (2%), other countries of the EU – 902.400 persons (16%) [6] (Fig. 3).

Almost 30.000 citizens of Ukraine registered in Slovenia – 8.400 persons; Luxembourg – 6.700 persons; North Macedonia – 6.200 persons; Azerbaijan – 3.900 persons; Malta – 1.600 persons; Iceland – 1.700 persons; Albania – 2.600 persons. However, the migration crisis was practically not felt in Armenia – 400 persons; Liechtenstein – 400 persons; Bosnia and Herzegovina – 100 persons [6]. The choice of destination countries preferred by Ukrainians was due to the presence of relatives/acquaintances and proximity to their homeland.

Thus, every tenth Ukrainian was forced to seek temporary shelter somewhere in the world. The escala-




Fig. 1. Migrant groups and their classification




Fig. 2. Countries of the world that Ukrainians chose for migration




Fig. 3. The EU countries selected by Ukrainian refugees seeking temporary asylum

tion of the international armed conflict has led to dramatic changes in the usual life of civilians, forcing people to leave their homes in search of safety, protection and assistance. Making use of the Dublin Convention [7], millions of refugees have crossed the border into neighboring countries.

According to the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, about 4.9 million Ukrainian citizens (1% of the population of EU countries) received temporary protection status in Europe until January 3, 2023. This is also proved by numerical submission of applications for temporary protection in other countries. Out of 1.5 million displaced persons, alone the Polish Consulate received applications from 1.391.344 citizens, which is 92%; Germany, in turn, from 70%. Ukrainian DPs choose Turkey rather as a transit country, so the percentage of applications is the smallest there [8; 9] (Fig. 4).

The migration of Ukrainians to the territory of the aggressor country and Belarus was also recorded. Despite the Geneva Convention relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War [10], thousands of citizens were sent to more than 66 camps thousands of kilometers from their homes. The bases of former Soviet sanatoriums, orphanages, dormitories and other facilities in Siberia, the Caucasus, the Arctic Circle and the Far East are inhabited by Ukrainians of all ages from regions of Ukraine that were under Russian occupation [11] (Fig. 5).

Physical impact, violence, «filtration camps», persecution, detention, psychological oppression, abuse of power, and deliberate creation of an environment of danger have resulted in millions of crippled lives. According to official UNHCR data, since the beginning of the full-scale invasion, 1.302.990 people have left the territory of Ukraine in the direction of Russia and Belarus. The

asylum application was submitted by 100.835 and 2.790 persons respectively [12] (Tbl. 1).

Despite the common long border with Belarus, which supports Russia's aggression against Ukraine, only 27.675 Ukrainian citizens have crossed it. However, UNHCR does not currently have data on the number of Ukrainians who have received temporary protection in this country.

Since 2014, 1.8 million Ukrainians have found themselves in the aggressor country. Some of them are residents of the so-called «LPR» and «DPR», whose evacuation to the territory of the eastern neighbor was inspired by the Russian authorities before February 24 [13]. According to British intelligence, the number of deported population is much larger and amounts to about 3.000.000 Ukrainians (7% of the population of Ukraine) [11]. It is currently unknown how many left and applied voluntarily for asylum/citizenship in the aggressor country, and how many were forced to.

Unlike Russia and Belarus, European countries provide Ukrainians with asylum on a transparent legal basis. The EU Council Directive «On minimum standards for granting temporary protection in the event of a massive influx of displaced persons and on measures contributing to the balance of efforts between Member States to receive such persons and responsibility for the consequences of such admission» [10] has set a model for temporary protection measures. For the first time in practice, it was applied specifically to Ukrainians, giving them the right to residence, education, medical care.

In terms of its extent, geography of coverage, quantitative indicators and time frame, the current Ukrainian forced migration crisis has no analogues. Every day of a horrible war brings new painful losses both on the front line and the relatively quiet territories.




Fig. 4. Number of Ukrainian forced migrants in the first year of the Russian-Ukrainian war



Fig. 5. Locations of resettlement camps in Russia

Table 1

Share of Ukrainians living in Russia and Belarus since February 24, 2022.

Country	Date	Refugees from Ukraine registered as of the date	Refugees from Ukraine who have applied for asylum	Border crossing from Ukraine (since 24.02.2022)	Border crossing to Ukraine (since 24.02.2022)
Russia	31.12.2022	1.275.315	100.835	2.852.395	Data missing
Belarus	01.05.2023	27.675	2.790	16.705	Data missing
Total	X	1.302.990	103.625	2.869.100	Data missing

As of June 2023, the number of refugees from Ukraine registered worldwide amounts to 6.303.500 people, of which 5.958.800 are registered in Europe and 344.700 people – on other continents [13]. The vast majority of migrants (83.2%) are mothers with minor children and pregnant women. Of these, 65% are of working age, from 18 to 59 years. 17.3% of surveyed refugees went abroad with a husband or wife, 12.9% themselves. The largest share of women surveyed – 63.4% – went abroad with minor children [14].

During the two months of the war, 2.510 Ukrainian babies were born in Poland only [15]. This situation is also observed in other countries, where many pregnant Ukrainian women found themselves on occasion.

Taking account of the horrors of war, the vulnerable psyche of children and adolescents is affected by explosions, air raid alarms, artillery shelling. 82% of young people suffered losses due to the war. The most common problems are: decrease or loss of income – 36%; deterioration of mental health – 28%; for 18%, separation from family was difficult; 14% – death of loved ones; 6% – damage to housing and 6% – physical injuries related to hostilities [16].

Speaking of the younger generation, Polish schools and kindergartens attend 187.900 Ukrainian children who arrived after the beginning of the war in Ukraine. As of February 14, 2023, Poland's preschool education system was concerned with about 43.800 children from Ukraine who arrived after February 24, 2022. In secondary schools of the friendly neighboring country during this period studied about 116.800 Ukrainian students; in lyceums, technical schools and vocational schools – 27.200 Ukrainian students [17]. About a quarter of all DPs are pupils or students.

In terms of its extent, geography of coverage, quantitative indicators and time frame, the current Ukrainian forced migration crisis has no analogues. Every day of a horrible war brings new painful losses both on the front line and the relatively quiet territories.

As of June 2023, the number of refugees from Ukraine registered worldwide is 6.303.500 people, of which 5.958.800 are in Europe; 344.700 people – on other continents [8] (Tbl. 2).

The number of refugees does not stop growing even after 1.5 years of war. In addition to war crimes, the

present situation is worsened by an environmental catastrophe – the blowing up of the dam of the Kakhovka HPP by the Russian occupiers. According to official data, since the beginning of the active phase of Russia's military aggression, the population of Ukraine has decreased by 6.700.000 people, and the negative balance of migration in 2022 has already amounted to 9.430.000 citizens. The volume of current migration exceeds all indicators for the period of independence of Ukraine, which the State gained in 1991. Only 9% of Ukrainians who fled the war to Europe have remote work in their homeland as their main source of income. In general, the lion's share of Ukrainian refugees in the host country are employed, both permanently and temporarily.

Among refugees are Ukrainians from all regions of the country. The damage or destruction of infrastructure, including enterprises, housing, social infrastructure buildings, will directly affect the desire to stay abroad and not return to Ukraine, in particular, concerning the residents of Donbas and the Azov Sea region [19] (Fig. 6).

The category of people who have left the settlement where the hostilities took place is 55.4%. This includes the most affected regions of Ukraine. 12.9% of Ukrainian citizens left their homes in areas where hostilities were taking place nearby; 9.9% – where there were no hostilities, but their settlement was bombed or shelled; 13.9% – where fighting took place in a neighboring settlement, and only 7.9% said that there was no fighting or shooting in their settlement or nearby, but nevertheless they left the country [20] (Fig. 7).

Most Ukrainians prefer fraternal Poland. As of June 2023, 1.618.785 Ukrainian citizens receive asylum in there. In total, there are 2.783.620 people in the countries of the European Union [8] (Fig. 8).

The large-scale war, which has raised a wave of forced migrants, especially those of working and reproductive age, has caused many security, social, economic, financial, family, and demographic problems. In 2022, Ukraine's GDP dropped by almost a third, as businesses were either located in the occupied territories or were destroyed and looted by the occupier. However, it will be a long and difficult task to restore the economy in the post-war period, and it will require such resource as people: young and skilled.

Table 2

Share of Ukrainians living in the EU countries since February 24, 2022

Country	Date	Refugees from Ukraine registered as of the date	Refugees from Ukraine who have applied for asylum	Border crossing from Ukraine (since 24.02.2022)	Border crossing to Ukraine (since 24.02.2022)
Bulgaria	12.06.2023	160.575	161.420	Data missing	Data missing
Greece	18.06.2023	345.880	528.045	Data missing	Data missing
Estonia	05.06.2023	48.590	50.625	Data missing	Data missing
Hungary	18.06.2023	52.335	36.315	2.879.080	Data missing
Latvia	31.12.2022	38.145	47.940	Data missing	Data missing
Lithuania	02.06.2023	77.545	77.490	Data missing	Data missing
Poland	13.06.2023	994.775	1.618.785	12.340.655	10.047.730
Moldova	18.06.2023	110.855	7.980	848.830	498.165
Romania	18.06.2023	136.075	136.075	2.592.450	2.136.525
Slovakia	18.06.2023	102.910	118.945	1.457.890	1.258.780
Total	X	2.067.685	2783.620	20.118.905	13.941.200




Fig. 6. The scale of destruction of Ukrainian cities as a result of Russian aggression

The massive migration outflow is a major demographic loss for Ukraine, as migrant women have a higher chance of marrying foreigners and never returning home. 36.6% of Ukrainian women left the country at the age of 30–39; 25.7% – 40–49; 18.8% – 16–29; only 7.9% – over 60, and 10.9% – 50–59 years [21] (Fig. 9).

At the beginning of the war, about 90% intended to return home. In April 2023, 49.7% of Ukrainian migrants have already expressed this desire [24]. Non-return of Ukrainians will have a significant impact on the national economy, which may lose from 2.55% to 7.71% of GDP [22]. After the war, between 860.000 and 2.7 million Ukrainian refugees may remain abroad. Unfortunately, the longer the war lasts, the more migrants integrate into foreign society (Fig. 10).

Many of the refugees dream of returning home to their families, working in their home country, rebuilding it, and living in a habitual environment. But among those who have left, there are mostly young Ukrainian women with children or entire families who can easily adapt abroad, learn the language and find a decent job. In addition to homesickness, social security and economic freedom will be important for the forced Ukrainian migrants, which will depend on the conditions of work and decent financial remuneration for its performance.

CONCLUSIONS

The destruction of enterprises, housing, social infrastructure buildings will directly affect the desire to stay in a chosen place abroad and not return to Ukraine.




Fig. 7. Reasons that influenced the migration of Ukrainians




Fig. 8. Dynamics of refugees from Ukraine as of June 2023

Due to the matter that mainly women, children and adolescents have fled the war, the demographic, sex and age structure of the population will change in the Ukrainian State, which will cause negative adjustments to the socio-economic future of the country.

The increase in the number of Ukrainian migrants will contribute to the further development of many spheres of the economy and the expansion of economic potential in a foreign land. Refugees in need of employment can solve the problems of labor shortages in regions of Europe that were not in demand even among usual migrant workers.

Liberalizing the policy of higher and vocational education for foreigners will facilitate the integration of young people into the development of foreign countries. In this way, a whole generation of young, skilled workers will be able to fill gaps in the economy and contribute to both further development and GDP growth away from their homeland.

The situation is critical due to the young age of refugees, as there are 1.07 children per adult migrant, and among adults, the largest share is women aged 25–49, of whom 70% have higher education. The outflow of the State's strategic resources from science, medicine, in-




Fig. 9. Age structure of Ukrainian women abroad




Fig. 10. Plans for the return of Ukrainian migrants to Ukraine

formation technology, economics, and engineering is a negative factor for Ukraine's future development.

The social problem is no less threatening, as there is a possibility that Ukrainian families will be reunited in Europe after the war; some marriages, in general, will break up because of a long life separately. After the war, between 860.000 and 2.7 million Ukrainian refugees may remain abroad. Non-return of Ukrainians will have a significant impact on the national economy, which may lose from 2.55% to 7.71% of GDP [22].


The reasons that will encourage Ukrainians to return home even despite the hostilities may include:

- ✦ difficulties with adaptation,
- ✦ lack of knowledge of a foreign language,
- ✦ inability to find a job,
- ✦ longing for home and family members who were unable to leave, etc.

Security should be a key factor in the return of Ukrainians, but for a significant number of refugees, the availability of housing, infrastructure, and jobs in Ukraine will also be important. The war has demonstrat-

ed that there are sectors in Ukraine that are much more productive than in Europe, and it makes sense to focus on higher productivity for other sectors of the economy as well (Fig. 11) [23].

The affected regions will require the largest financial injections. The population that has lost all the comforts of life will be interested in decent jobs and housing or subsidized rent in relatively safe regions of Ukraine.



The return of Ukrainian refugees to their homeland should be an important priority and implementation of sound government policy just now. However, after the war, of importance will be the development of territories and living of people on the border with Russia and Belarus:

- ✦ the territory has to be populated;
- ✦ Israeli option: residents and businesses will be paid extra for risks;
- ✦ people who will work there for a salary on a rotational basis;
- ✦ creation of military settlements, etc. [24].

In addition, it will be necessary to:

- ✦ demine territories;
- ✦ restore the agricultural sector;
- ✦ enlarge amalgamated hromadas (AHs);
- ✦ provide tax and customs benefits for the restoration of damaged enterprises;
- ✦ rebuild and modernize medical institutions/reehabilitation centers, etc.

The destroyed regions need to be rebuilt because Ukrainians must have a place to return to. The amount of funds that will be allocated for reconstruction is also important. Particular attention should be paid to frozen Russian assets found in the democratic world. They will provide the largest financial resource, in addition to investments, for Ukraine's rapid recovery and will create millions of new jobs.

Both government agencies and private organizations should pay attention to employment issues.

Another important component is the need to maintain ties with children who are currently abroad through online education for children who could be taught by Ukrainian teachers using the Ukrainian curriculum [25].

Government programs for the restoration of the country, attracting foreign investors, world programs for the restoration of industry and the agricultural sector should support the movement of returning citizens to Ukraine. According to the «Plan for the Reconstruction of Ukraine» [26], it is necessary to conduct a comprehensive analysis of Ukrainian migrants who have received temporary protection in the EU, and to conclude with European countries a number of programs and agreements in the field of migration policy that will help create comfortable conditions for the return of citizens to Ukraine.

Of course, cultural exchange and the formation of friendships/partnerships will contribute to a better understanding of culture and mentality. Ukrainians will get an education, gain new experience, broaden their horizons, and formulate an understanding of what they want their country to be like. Forced migration will provide new experiences and opportunities to gain both material and spiritual resources to improve their lives and bring about positive changes in the country we call Home. ■

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