

Kuzminskyi, A. M., and Sopko, V. V. *Orhanizatsiia bukhhalter-skoho obliku i analizu hospodarskoi diialnosti* [Organization of accounting and business analysis]. Kyiv: Vyshcha shkola, 1986.

Khorunzhak, N. M. "Orhanizatsiini zasady rozvytku systemy obliku biudzhetykh ustanov u suchasnykh umovakh" [Organizational basis for the development of the accounting systems of budget institutions under modern conditions]. *Biznes Inform*, no. 12 (2013): 269-275.

[Legal Act of Ukraine] (1999). <http://zakon2.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/996-14>

Luchko, M. R. "Piznannia v rozvytku teorii bukhhalterskoho obliku" [Knowledge in the development of accounting theory].

Naukovyi visnyk Uzhhorodskoho universytetu. Seriya «Ekonomika», no. 1 (2) (2015): 33-38.

Makurin, A. A. "Problemy oblikovoho zabezpechennia hospodarskykh operatsii v konteksti yevrointehratsii Ukrainy" [Issues accounting ensure that business transactions in the context of European integration of Ukraine]. *Biznes Inform*, no. 11 (2014): 233-237.

Orhanizatsiia bukhhalterskoho obliku [Organization of accounting]. Zhytomyr: Ruta, 2002.

Orhanizatsiia bukhhalterskoho obliku [Organization of accounting]. Kyiv: Tsentri navchalnoi literatury, 2006.

UDC 657

MODELS AND FACTORS OF AUDIT AND NAS PRICING: LITERATURE OVERVIEW

© 2016 SHULHA S. V.

UDC 657

Shulha S. V. Models and Factors of Audit and NAS Pricing: Literature Overview

The research is aimed at analyzing audit and NAS pricing models evolution with application of the narrative approach and testing the hypothesis of multi-variable mixed stochastic development of audit pricing models by the data envelopment analysis. The main findings support the hypothesis of pricing models shift from endogenous to exogenous factors that can be explained by the growing pressure of main stakeholders – clients and regulators – through their control of ethical, quality, social and public governance issues. The DEA allowed to range the factors in 3 main groups: 1) direct factors influencing pricing decision; 2) indirect factors influencing pricing decision; 3) one-off, episode factors of influence. With regard to the obtained results further research should be focused on challenges for developing countries affecting audit and NAS pricing models.

Keywords: audit fees, pricing models, unit costs, audit market.

Tabl.: 2. **Bibl.:** 30.

Shulha Svitlana V. – PhD (Economics), Associate Professor, Associate Professor of the Department of Audit, The National Academy of Statistics, Accounting and Auditing (1 Pidhirna Str., Kyiv, 04107, Ukraine)

E-mail: stshulga@ukr.net

УДК 657

Шульга С. В. Моделі та фактори ціноутворення в аудиті та неаудиторських послугах: огляд літератури

Дослідження спрямоване на аналіз витоків еволюції моделей ціноутворення в аудиті та неаудиторських послугах шляхом застосування нарративного підходу, а також на тестування гіпотези поліваріативного змішаного стохастичного розвитку моделей ціноутворення в аудиті інструментами аналізу середовища функціонування. Основні результати підтримують гіпотезу щодо зміщення моделей ціноутворення в аудиті в бік екзогенних факторів, що можна пояснити зростаючим тиском з боку основних зацікавлених осіб – клієнтів та регуляторів – шляхом контролю за етичними, якісними, соціальними та державними аспектами послуг. Зроблено ранжування факторів за наслідками аналізу середовища функціонування на три основні групи: 1) прямого впливу на рішення щодо ціноутворення; 2) непрямого впливу на рішення щодо ціноутворення; 3) разових, епізодичних факторів впливу. З огляду на отримані результати додаткові дослідження мають бути спрямовані на виклики для країн, що розвиваються, які впливають на моделі ціноутворення в аудиті та неаудиторських послугах.

Ключові слова: ціна аудиту, моделі ціноутворення, витрати на одиницю послуг, аудиторський ринок.

Табл.: 2. **Бібл.:** 30.

Шульга Світлана Володимирівна – кандидат економічних наук, доцент, доцент кафедри аудиту, Національна академія статистики, обліку та аудиту (вул. Підгірна, 1, Київ, 04107, Україна)

E-mail: stshulga@ukr.net

УДК 657

Шульга С. В. Модели и факторы ценообразования в аудите и неаудиторских услугах: обзор литературы

Исследование направлено на анализ истоков эволюции моделей ценообразования в аудите и неаудиторских услугах путем применения нарративного подхода, а также на тестирование гипотезы мультивариантности смешанного стохастического развития моделей ценообразования в аудите инструментами анализа среды функционирования. Основные результаты подтверждают гипотезу о смещении моделей ценообразования в сторону экзогенных факторов, что объясняется нарастающим давлением со стороны основных заинтересованных лиц – клиентов и регуляторов – путем контроля за этическими, качественными, социальными и государственными аспектами услуг. Проведено ранжирование факторов по результатам анализа среды функционирования на три основные группы: 1) прямого воздействия на решение о ценообразовании; 2) косвенного воздействия на решение о ценообразовании; 3) разовые, эпизодические факторы воздействия. Полученные результаты показывают, что дальнейшие исследования должны быть направлены на вызовы для развивающихся стран, влияющие на модели ценообразования в аудите и неаудиторских услугах.

Ключевые слова: цена аудита, модели ценообразования, затраты на единицу услуг, аудиторский рынок.

Табл.: 2. **Библ.:** 30.

Шульга Светлана Владимировна – кандидат экономических наук, доцент, доцент кафедры аудита, Национальная академия статистики, учета и аудита (ул. Подгорная, 1, Киев, 04107, Украина)

E-mail: stshulga@ukr.net

БУХГАЛТЕРСЬКИЙ ОБЛІК І АУДИТ

ЕКОНОМІКА

Audit and non-audit services (NAS) pricing has been a subject for public discourse for a long time. Despite evolution of existing models of audit pricing, both clients and regulators try to negotiate auditor's fees

and make them more relevant to the volume (and quality) of services supplied. While general findings in this area in developed countries refer to 1990s, less developed equity markets and stock exchanges in Ukraine seriously restricted

the flexibility of market performance thus imposing heavy consequences on main stakeholders' interrelations: low audit quality [1], vague independence of audit engagements (combining audit and NAS services to one client) [2] assuming existing of contestable audit market [3].

Catch-up regime of the Ukrainian audit market development in relation to the EU posed additional pressure on qualified businesses being strongly undervalued with humble internal market potential resulting from highly corrupted mandatory audit schemes for public sector enterprises and clients' financial constrains. Despite regular analysis of audit fee components in developing countries, researchers in Ukraine are focused on challenges with quality of services and ethics (see [1–4]).

The growing complexity of markets and businesses impose further challenges on audit business. Evolution of business-models within and cross countries, multi differentiation and global supply chain design require from auditors to rethink their approaches to risks (both personal and client's) assessment.

As models and factors of audit and NAS pricing are also under regular revision there is a need to find out the roots of their complexity. We suggest that audit market design evolved from endogenous to exogenous factors, thus want to test a hypothesis of multi-variable mixed stochastic development of audit pricing models.

The *aim* of our research is to trace the roots of evolution of audit and NAS pricing models, and to generalize factors influencing audit and non-audit services fees.

To address this hypothesis we will apply narrative approach to analyze shift from relatively simple endogenous cost-based models to complex combined cost-risk exogenous fee models. Additionally, using data envelopment analysis (DEA) to determinants of audit and NAS pricing we will try to range them by expected impact. The limitation of research is based on acceptance of results of analyzed publications. We will not provide additional econometric testing of obtained results.

Development of audit markets world-wide evolves together with firm's business models affecting pricing models. As Dan A. Simunic (1980) states: "...the essential interdependence of the auditee's and auditor's economic interests is recognized. The model allows for auditor independence in the sense that the auditor implements *q* as a complement to the internal accounting system, *a*. An auditee demands a positive quantity of auditing because external auditors have some advantage (relative to internal systems) in certain aspects of control. In the model, therefore, an auditor is independent in the same sense as is any supplier of a service who seeks competently to perform a task demanded by a customer. The auditee and auditor are not always adversaries. Although their economic interests may diverge in ex-post litigation, as each tries to minimize losses, the hypothesis regarding liability avoidance motivation implies that, at the time of the audit, there is a mutuality in the auditee's and auditor's private interests vis-à-vis the external world" [25; p. 188–189].

S. Whisenant et al (2003) finds that audit and non-audit fees are related indirectly through the parameters de-

termining each fee, yet, "single-equation specifications of either audit or NAS suffer from a statistical misspecification or simultaneous-equations bias, that can make coefficient estimates unreliable" [30, p. 742].

Giroux & McLelland (2008) used a sample of large cities with the data for 1996 and five constructs to explain audit fees: client size, complexity of client operations, financial risks including demographic characteristics, auditing factors, and governance structure. The final model observed six factors explaining audit fees both with direct (size, complexity, risks, financial variables and brand) and indirect (corporate governance, brand, complexity and tax share) effects [15].

I. Raluca (2011) finds that audit fee models are basically in form of linear regression, which quantifies the size through a wide range of parameters including dummy variables for qualitative factors. He identifies the need for a segmental approach to the market with the following criteria: legal and statutory obligation and denomination as a business segment, size of the audited entity and the criterion of geographical delimitation of the entity location; and determines parameters to be taken into consideration for the future quantification models: auditor's membership or non-membership in BIG4, subsidiary auditor's functioning as body corporate or self-employed person, existence of foreign subsidiaries of audited entity, auditor's opinion, whether pertinent or not, existence of a clash of interests at the level of top management (it is possible to have the general manager involved by holding or not holding shares [21, p. 384]

M. Picconi and J. K. Reynolds (2013) state: "The logarithmic model assumes that the elasticity of fees with respect to company size is constant over the range of assets. We show that this assumption is not correct. To date, recognition of a misspecification with regard to company size has been sporadic in the literature. When studies do address the issue, it nearly always takes the form of a robustness check against sample-wide inferences using a median split on assets, or in rare cases, nonparametric robustness checks..." and "The logarithmic model also assumes that all other audit fee determinants affect the magnitude of audit fees in an exponentially increasing manner, or with linearly increasing elasticity. We demonstrate that for a number of common predictor variables neither constant nor strict linearly increasing elasticity holds" [20, p. 30].

Literature analysis based on sources [5–30] resulted in identification of 4 general audit pricing models both for audit and NAS services (*Table 1*).

Endogenous type:

- 1) *Cost-based model* – cost per unit is labor-dependent with insignificant external factors;
- 2) *Cost plus premium model* – cost-per unit accounts qualification of staff, thus, exogenous are generally neglected.

Exogenous type:

- 3) *Risks-based pricing model* – assignment varies due to observed internal and external risks of the auditor and the client;
- 4) *Combined cost + risks model* – complex model with multi-stage cost-per-unit calculation with respect to ethical, quality, social and public governance issues.

Models of audit and NAS pricing

Model	Author(– s)	Model description
Cost – based	Simunic, 1980 [25]	$FEE, ASSETS = b_0 + b_1SUBS - t - b_2DIVERS H - b_3FORGN - l - b_4RECV - l - b_5INV - l - b_6PROFIT + b_7LOSS - l - b_8SUBJ + b_9, TIME + b_{10}AUDITOR - l - u.$ <p>ASSETS – total assets at year – end; SUBS – number of consolidated subsidiaries; DIVERS – number of two – digit SIC industries in which auditee operates, less than one; FORGN – foreign assets, total assets at year – end; RECV – accounts, loans, and notes receivable, total assets at year – end; INV – inventories, total assets at year – end. Control variables for differences in the assessed loss – sharing ratio: PROFITS – net income, total assets; LOSS – variable where (1) if auditee incurred loss in any of last three fiscal years SUBJ – variable where (1) if auditee received a "subject to" qualified opinion; Control variable for differences in auditor's production functions: TIME – number of years auditee has used current auditor; Auditor identity: AUDITOR – variable where (1) if auditor is a Big Eight firm</p>
Cost – premium, Risks – based	Whisenant et al, 2003 [30]	$LNAUDIT_i = \alpha_0 + \alpha_1 LNNAF_i + \alpha_2 DETERMINANTS_i + e_i,$ $LNNAF_i = \beta_0 + \beta_1 LNAUDIT_i + \beta_2 DETERMINANTS_i + v_i,$ <p>where i denotes firm subscripts, LNAUDIT and LNNAF are the natural logs of audit and non – audit fees, respectively, and DETERMINANTS is a vector of factors shown to influence audit and non – audit fees (up to 15 factors)</p>
Combined	Giroux, Andrew McLelland, 2008 [15]	$LNFEES = \beta_1 LNPOP + \beta_2 FV + \beta_3 TAXSHARE + \beta_4 COMPUNIT + \beta_5 CPOP + \beta_6 BIG6 + e_{1t},$ <p>where LNPOP – Log of Population; FV – Financial Viability; TAXSHARE – Tax Share; CompUNIT – Component Units; CPOP – Change in Population; BIG6 – Big 6 Auditor</p>
	Raluca, 2011 [21]	$\text{Amount} = \alpha_0 + \alpha_1 * \text{Total Assets} + \alpha_2 * \text{Turnover} + \alpha_3 * \text{Number of employees}$
	Picconi & Reynolds, 2013 [20]	$\ln(\text{Audit Fees})_i, t = \alpha + \beta_1 \ln(\text{Total Assets})_i, t + \beta_2 \text{AUDSIZE}_i, t + \beta_3 \text{AUDCHG}_i, t + \beta_4 \text{NONDECYR}_i, t + \beta_5 \text{OPINLAG}_i, t + \beta_6 \text{GC_OPIN}_i, t + \beta_7 \text{M}_i, t + \beta_8 \text{SOX}_i, t + \beta_9 \text{IC_OPIN}_i, t + \beta_{10} \text{QUICK}_i, t + \beta_{11} \text{STOCKFIN}_i, t + \beta_{12} \text{DEBTFIN}_i, t + \beta_{13} \text{INVARECA}_i, t + \beta_{14} \text{EX_DISC}_i, t + \beta_{15} \text{DEBTA}_i, t + \beta_{16} \text{ROA}_i, t + \beta_{17} \text{LOSS}_i, t + \beta_{18} \text{NUMSEGS}_i, t + \beta_{19} \text{FOR_PCT}_i, t + \beta_{20} \text{ACQ}_i, t + \beta_{21} \text{RESTR}_i, t + \beta_{22} \text{RESTATE}_i, t + \beta_{23} \text{ZSCORE}_i, t + \beta_{24} \text{AGE}_i, t + \text{Industry Dummies} + e_i, t,$ <p>where NONDECYR – indicator variable defined as 1 if the company has a non – December fiscal year end, and 0 otherwise (base on Compustat FYR); OPINLAG – number of days between the end of the company's fiscal year and the date on which the audit report is issued (from Audit Analytics); GC_OPIN – indicator variable defined as 1 if the company received a modification to its audit opinion, and 0 otherwise (from Audit Analytics); M, B – company's market to book ratio at the beginning of the fiscal year (Compustat PRCC_F, (CEQ,CSHO)); SOX – indicator variable defined as 1 if the company's controls were audited pursuant to SOX section 404, and 0 otherwise (from Audit Analytics); IC_OPIN – indicator variable defined as 1 if the company received an adverse opinion due to material weaknesses in internal controls during the year, and 0 otherwise (from Audit Analytics); QUICK – Quick ratio; STOCKFIN – indicator variable defined as 1 if the company engaged in any stock financing during the year, and 0 otherwise (based on Compustat SSTK > 0); DEBTFIN – indicator variable defined as 1 if the company engaged in any debt financing during the year, and 0 otherwise (based on Compustat DLTIS > 0); INVARECA – ratio of inventory plus receivables to total assets (Compustat (RECT + INVT),AT); EX_DISC – indicator variable defined as 1 if the company reported any extraordinary or discontinued items for the year, and 0 otherwise (based on Compustat XI > 0); DEBTA – ratio of debt to total assets (Compustat DLTT,AT); ROA – return on assets (Compustat EBIT,AT); LOSS – indicator variable defined as 1 if the company reported a net loss during the year, and 0 otherwise (based on Compustat NI); NUMSEGS – the square root of the number of operating segments reported (from Compustat segment data); FOR_PCT – percentage of sales from foreign operations (from Compustat segment data); RESTATE – indicator variable defined as 1 if the company was engaged in restatement activities during the year, 0 otherwise (from Audit Analytics); RESTR – indicator variable defined as 1 if the company engaged in any restructuring activities during the year, and 0 otherwise (based on Compustat RCP > 0); ZSCORE – bankruptcy score from Zmijewski (1984), computed as: $-4.336 - 4.513*ROA + 5.679*\text{Leverage} + 0.004*\text{Current Ratio}$. Note that a higher score indicates greater financial distress. $ROA = (NI+TIE),AT$. $\text{Leverage} = LT,AT$. $\text{Current Ratio} = ACT, LCT$</p>

Source: author's analysis.

The publications analysis defines a great variety of audit and NAS pricing determinants, among them we would like to focus on the most citable ones:

- ✦ *client, auditor size*: this factor is among widely used in explaining audit and NAS price variance. Client's size positively correlates with the number of audit procedures required, as each business segment and group of transactions will be additionally examined, corporate governance interlinks the analyzed operational and fraud risks. Auditor's size depicts its capacity to cope with complex issues and extraordinary operations through ability to engage partners and additional subcontractors. Besides, large audit firms usually outperform their small vis-à-vis in internal quality control and staff engagement;
- ✦ *auditor switching*: there are opposite views on new auditor appointment effect on audit pricing. On one hand, new auditor needs more time to get full and comprehensive understanding of the auditee's business, thus additional efforts need to be compensated; on other hand – unit cost of new auditor is usually lower due to client's risks underestimation. So auditor switching can shift firm's pricing in any direction;
- ✦ *efficiency of auditor staff*: large audit firms have a priori higher labor force utilization ratio due to engagement in more cases, while the staff of small auditors with less clients usually underperforms;
- ✦ *short-term debt, financially-stressed*: several studies suggest that clients with high level of short-term debt and/or financially stressed face additional problems with going-concern principle. This leads to higher audit fee and risk to obtain a modified auditor opinion (Table 2);
- ✦ *NAS provision*: many publications before SOX (Sarbanes-Oxley Act) stressed on high dependence between audit and NAS pricing. After their regulatory decoupling impact of non-audit services on audit pricing can not be tracked, thus, revenue from NAS remains to be one of the main sources of business profits;

Table 2

Factors of audit and non-audit services pricing

Factor	Client, auditor size	Industry specialization	Auditor switching	Efficiency of auditor staff	Short-term debt, financially-stressed	NAS provision	Earnings manipulation risks	Corporate governance risks, internal control	Assets & Sales, their structure	Type of audit	Brand selectivity	IFRS adjustment, tax share
Author	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13
Abdulmalik & Ahmad, 2016 [5]								+				
Basioudis et al, 2006 [6]	+				+	+						
Barkess & Simnett, 1994 [7]						+						
Beattie & Fearnley, 2002 [8]				+		+		+				
Bedard & Johnstone, 2004 [9]							+	+				
Butterworth&Houghton, 1995 [10]			+									
Carson & Fargher, 2007 [11]	+	+										
Chung & Lindsay, 2010 [12]	+								+			
Dopuch et al, 2003 [13]				+								
Fields,Fraser & Wilkins, 2004 [14]	+	+					+	+	+			
Giroux & McLelland, 2008 [15]	+							+	+		+	+
Gul & Goodwin, 2010 [16]					+							
Ireland & Lennox, 2002 [17]	±						-				+	
Lima Castro et al, 2016 [18]	+	+	+				+	+	+		+	
Pong & Whittington, 1994 [19]	+								+			
Picconi & Reynolds, 2013 [20]		+										
Raluca, 2011 [21]								+	+	+	+	
Riadska, 2014 [22]	+								+			
Mohrmann, Riepe & Stefani, 2013 [23]								+	+			

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13
Dos Santos et al, 2016 [24]							+	+	+			
Simunic, 1980 [25]	±							+	+			
Sundgren & Svanström, 2013 [26]	+									+		
Thornton & Moore, 2006 [27]	+							+				
Vieru & Schadewitz, 2010 [28]									+			+
Dutillieux & Willekens, 2009 [29]		+									+	
Whisenant et al, 2003 [30]	+	+				+		+			+	
Total matches	13	6	2	2	2	4	4	12	11	2	6	2

Source: author's analysis, based on [4–29].

- ✦ *earnings manipulation risks*: companies with high earnings manipulation risks require additional counterfeit procedures thus hiking unit cost;
- ✦ *corporate governance risks, internal control*: efficient corporate governance and internal control system lower auditor's risks and the contract price;
- ✦ *type of audit*: mandatory and voluntary audit generate different motivation of clients. Usually mandatory audit is forced by regulators and is undesirable by corporate governance boards (especially in public sector where efficiency of resource utilization is relatively lower compared with private entities). Voluntary audit is a part of larger transactions (e.g. IPO, M&A), although it shows the owner, governance board initiative and provides additional transparency to business;
- ✦ *assets & sales, their structure*: complexity of business operations is revealed in balance sheet and PL form – company operating in different product and service markets under several jurisdictions with many subsidiaries is likely to have more fraud, manipulation and misstatement risks. So the unit cost and volume of services for such businesses will be higher;
- ✦ *brand selectivity*: auditor affiliation to BIG4 or second tier firms usually corresponds with higher quality, internal audit control, sector experience, sustainability and investor trust;
- ✦ *IFRS adjustment, tax share*: companies IFRS adjustment and/or tax planning also influence auditor's risks and need additional procedures for assessment.

Based on results from Table 2 we can range the determinants of audit and NAS pricing in the following groups:

1) **direct factors, influencing pricing decision**: auditor, client size, corporate governance risks; efficiency of internal control system; structure of assets & sales;

2) **indirect factors, influencing pricing decision**: industry specialization; brand selectivity; earnings manipulation risks; NAS provision;

3) **one-off, episode factors needed to be taken into account**: auditor switching; efficiency of auditor staff; short-term debt, financial stresses; type of audit, IFRS adjustment; tax share.

CONCLUSIONS

The main findings support the hypothesis of pricing models shift to exogenous factors that can be explained by the growing pressure of main stakeholders – clients and regulators – by the control of ethical, quality, social and public governance issues. The DEA ranging helped to generalize 3 groups of factors, influencing pricing decision: direct, indirect and one-off ones. Thus, we observe prevailing importance for audit and NAS pricing of such factors as company size, corporate governance risks, internal control system efficiency, structure of assets & sales, auditor brand and industry specialization. With regard to the obtained results, additional research should be focused on challenges in developing countries, affecting audit and NAS pricing models. ■

LITERATURE

1. **Короткий В. В.** Методологічні підходи контролю якості аудиторських послуг в Україні / В. В. Короткий, Я. В. Петраков // Вісник Чернігівського державного технологічного університету. – 2009. – № 38. – С.189–198.

2. **Лепехо М. В.** Концептуальні підходи до класифікації аудиторських послуг / М. В. Лепехо, Я. В. Петраков // Вісник Чернігівського державного технологічного університету. – 2009. – № 39. – С. 265–276.

3. **Петраков Я. В.** Теорія квазі-конкурентних ринків та аудит в Україні: проблема ідентифікації / Я. В. Петраков // Вісник Чернігівського державного технологічного університету. – 2013. – № 68. – С. 248–258.

4. **Shulha S.** Integrated Reporting as Competitive Advantage for Ukrainian Companies: Determinants vs. Biases / S. V. Shulha, Ya. V. Petrakov // Бізнес Інформ. – 2015. – № 10. – P. 26–30.

5. **Abdulmalik O. S.** Boardroom diversity and audit fees: director ethnicity, independent and nationality / Salau Abdulmalik O., Ayoib Che Ahmad // Audit financiar. – 2016. – Vol. XIV, No. 4 (136). – P. 413–423.

6. **Basioudis I.** Audit Fees, Non-audit Fees, and Auditor Reporting on UK Stressed Companies [Electronic resource] / Ilias G. Basioudis, Marshall A. Geiger, Vaggelis Papanastasiou. – Presentation Paper on National Auditing Conference University of Manchester, 2006. – 24 p. – Mode of access : <http://static.aston.ac.uk/asig/Basioudis.pdf>

7. **Barkess L.** The Provision of Other Services by Auditors: Independence and Pricing Issues [Electronic resource] / Lynn Barkess & Roger Simnett // Journal of Accounting and Business Research. – 1994. – Vol. 24, Iss. 94. – P. 99–108. – Mode of access : <http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/00014788.1994.9729469>

- 8. Beattie V.** Auditor Independence and Non-Audit Services: A Literature Review [Electronic resource] / Vivien Beattie, Stella Fearnley // Institute of Chartered Accountants in England and Wales, London, 2002. – Mode of access : https://www.researchgate.net/publication-/267686654_Auditor_Independence_and_Non-Audit_Services_A_Literature_Review
- 9. Bedard J. C.** Earnings Manipulation Risk, Corporate Governance Risk, and Auditors' Planning and Pricing Decisions / Jean C. Bedard and Karla M. Johnstone // *The Accounting Review*. – 2004. – Vol. 79, No. 2. – P. 277–304.
- 10. Butterworth S.** Auditor Switching: The Pricing of Audit Services / S. Butterworth, K. A. Houghton // *Journal of Business Finance and Accounting*. – 1995. – Vol. 22, Iss. 3. – P. 323–344.
- 11. Carson E.** Note on audit fee premiums to client size and industry specialization / Elizabeth Carson, Neil Fargher // *Accounting and Finance*. – 2007. – Vol. 47, Iss. 3. – P. 423–446.
- 12. Chung D.** The Pricing of Audit Services: The Canadian Perspective [Electronic resource] / Dennis Y. Chung, Daryl W. Lindsay // *Contemporary Accounting Research*. – 2010. – Vol. 5 (1). – P. 19–46. – Mode of access : https://www.researchgate.net/publication/229912637_The_Pricing_of_Audit_Services_The_Canadian_Perspective
- 13. Dopuch N.** Production Efficiency and the Pricing of Audit Services / Nicholas Dopuch, Mahendra Gupta, Dan A. Simunic, Michael T. Stein // *Contemporary Accounting Research*. – 2003. – Vol. 20, Iss.1. – P. 47–77.
- 14. Fraser R.** An Investigation of the Pricing of Audit Services for Financial Institutions [Electronic resource] L. Paige Fields, Donald R. Fraser, Michael S. Wilkins // *Journal of Accounting and Public Policy*. – 2004. – Vol. 23 (1). – P. 53–77. – Mode of access : http://digitalcommons.trinity.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1023&context=busadmin_faculty
- 15. Giroux G.** A Municipal Audit Fee Model Using Structural Equation Modeling [Electronic resource] Gary Giroux, Andrew McLelland // *The Journal of Applied Business Research*. – 2008. – Vol. 24, No. 3. – P. 135–146. – Mode of access : http://harbert.auburn.edu/~mcllej/research_files/JABR08.pdf
- 16. Gul F.** Short-Term Debt Maturity Structures, Credit Ratings, and the Pricing of Audit Services [Electronic resource] / Ferdinand A. Gul and John Goodwin // *The Accounting Review*. – 2010. – Vol. 85, No. 3. – P. 877–909. – Mode of access : <http://www.aaajournals.org/doi-/pdf/10.2308/accr.2010.85.3.877>
- 17. Ireland J.** The Large Audit Firm Fee Premium: A Case of Selectivity Bias? [Electronic resource] / Jen C. Ireland, Clive S. Lennox, *Journal of Accounting, Auditing and Finance* (2002), No.17(1), pp. 73–91. – Mode of access : <http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/download?doi=10.1.1.466.5926&rep=rep1&type=pdf>
- 18. Lima Castro W.** Determinants of Audit Fees: a Study in the Companies Listed on the BM&FBOVESPA, Brazil [Electronic resource] Walther Bottaro de Lima Castro, Ivam Ricardo Peleias, Glauco Peres da Silva, R. Cont. Fin. – USP. – 2016. – Vol. 26, No. 69. – P. 261–273. – Mode of access : http://www.scielo.br/pdf/rcf/v26n69/en_1808-057x-rcf-26-69-00261.pdf
- 19. Pong C.** The determinants of audit fees: Some empirical models / Christopher K. M. Pong, Geoffrey Whittington // *Journal of Business Finance & Accounting*. – 1994. – Vol. 21 (8). – P. 1071–1095.
- 20. Picconi M.** Audit Fee Theory and Estimation: A Consideration of the Logarithmic Audit Fee Model [Electronic resource] / M. Picconi, J. K. Reynolds // *College of William and Mary and Florida State University Working Papers*. – 2013. – 53 p. – Mode of access : https://mason.wm.edu/faculty/documents/audit_fee_model_picconi.pdf
- 21. Raluca I.** Audit Fee Econometrical Models: An Overview of the Auditing Research Literature [Electronic resource] / Ivan P. Oana Raluca // *Annales Universitatis Apulensis Series Oeconomica*. – 2011. – Vol. 13 (2). – P. 378–386.
- 22. Рядська В. В.** Аналіз розвитку взаємовідносин між ціною та якістю аудиторських послуг / В. В. Рядська // *Вісник Чернігівського державного технологічного університету*. – 2014. – № 2 (74). – С. 236–242. – Режим доступу : <http://economic-vistnic.stu.cn.ua/tmppdf/1319.pdf>
- 23. Riepe J.** Are Extensive Audits “Good News”? Market Perceptions of Abnormal Audit Fees and Fair Value Disclosures, Ulf Mohrmann [Electronic resource] / Jan Riepe, and Ulrike Stefani // *University of Konstanz Department of Economics Working Papers*. – 2013. – No. 8. – 45 p. – Mode of access : http://www.uni-konstanz.de/FuF/wiwi/workingpaper-series/WP_08-Mohrmann-Riepe-Stefani_2013.pdf
- 24. Dos Santos C.** Audit Fees, Non-Audit Fees and Corporate Performance [Electronic resource] / Cinderela Andrade dos Santos, António Cerqueira, Elísio Brandão // *FEP Working Papers*. – 2016. – No. 570. – 27 p. – Mode of access : <http://www.fep.up.pt/investigacao/-workingpapers/wp570.pdf>
- 25. Simunic D.** The Pricing of Audit Services: Theory and Evidence [Electronic resource] / Dan A. Simunic // *Journal of Accounting Research*. – 1980. – Vol. 18, No. 1. – P. 161–190. – Mode of access : <http://wlkc.gdqy.edu.cn/-res/skillsres/resources/2012/04/05/18/38E1C260-622E-4BE0-A260-C2B107218D65.pdf>
- 26. Sundgren S.** Audit office size, audit quality and audit pricing: evidence from small and medium-sized enterprises [Electronic resource] Stefan Sundgren, Tobias Svanström // *Accounting and Business Research*. – 2013. – Vol. 43 (1). – P. 31–55.
- 27. Thornton D.** Auditor Choice and Audit Fee Determinants [Electronic resource] Daniel B. Thornton, Giora Moore // *Journal of Business Finance & Accounting*. – 2006. – Vol. 20 (3). – P. 333–349. – Mode of access : https://www.researchgate.net/publication/229488198_Auditor_Choice_and_Audit_Fee_Determinants
- 28. Vieru M.** Impact of IFRS transition on audit and non-audit fees: evidence from small and medium-sized listed companies in Finland [Electronic resource] Markku Vieru and Hannu Schadewitz // *MPRA Paper Series*. – 2010. – No. 44664. – 32 p. – Mode of access : https://mpr.aub.uni-muenchen.de/44664/1/MPRA_paper_44664.pdf
- 29. Willekens M.** The Effect of Auditor Industry Specialization on Audit Pricing in Belgium Wouter Dutilleux and Marleen Willekens // *Review of Business and Economics*. – 2009. – No. 2. – P. 129–146.
- 30. Whisenant S.** Evidence on the Joint Determination of Audit and Non-Audit Fees Scott Whisenant, Srinivasan Sankaraguruswamy, K. Raghunandan // *Journal of Accounting Research*. – 2003. – Vol. 41. – No. 4. – P. 721–744.

REFERENCES

- Abdulmalik, O. S., and Ayoib, Ch. A. “Boardroom diversity and audit fees: director ethnicity, independent and nationality”. *Audit financiar*, vol. 14, no. 4(136) (2016): 413-423.
- Basioudis, I. G., Geiger, M. A., and Papanastasiou, V. “Audit Fees, Non-audit Fees, and Auditor Reporting on UK Stressed Companies”. *Presentation Paper on National Auditing Conference University of Manchester*. <http://static.aston.ac.uk/asig/Basioudis.pdf>
- Barkess, L., and Simnett, R. “The Provision of Other Services by Auditors: Independence and Pricing Issues”. <http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/00014788.1994.9729469>
- Beattie, V., and Fearnley, S. “Auditor Independence and Non-Audit Services: A Literature Review”. https://www.researchgate.net/publication/267686654_Auditor_Independence_and_Non-Audit_Services_A_Literature_Review.
- Bedard, J. C., and Johnstone, K. M. “Earnings Manipulation Risk, Corporate Governance Risk, and Auditors' Planning and Pricing Decisions”. *The Accounting Review*, vol. 79, no. 2 (2004): 277-304.

- Butterworth, S., and Houghton, K. A. "Auditor Switching: The Pricing of Audit Services". *Journal of Business Finance and Accounting*, vol. 22, no. 3 (1995): 323-344.
- Carson, E., and Fargher, N. "Note on audit fee premiums to client size and industry specialization". *Accounting and Finance*, vol. 47, no. 3 (2007): 423-446.
- Chung, D. Y., and Lindsay, D. W. "The Pricing of Audit Services: The Canadian Perspective" *Contemporary Accounting Research*. https://www.researchgate.net/publication/229912637_The_Pricing_of_Audit_Services_The_Canadian_Perspective
- Dopuch, N. et al. "Production Efficiency and the Pricing of Audit Services". *Contemporary Accounting Research*, vol. 20, no. 1 (2003): 47-77.
- Dos Santos, C., Cerqueira, A., and Brandao, E. "Audit Fees, Non-Audit Fees and Corporate Performance". <http://www.fep.up.pt/investigacao/workingpapers/wp570.pdf>
- Dutilleul, W., and Willekens, M. "The Effect of Auditor Industry Specialization on Audit Pricing in Belgium". *Review of Business and Economics*, no. 2 (2009): 129-146.
- Fields, L. P., Fraser, D. R., and Wilkins, M. S. "An Investigation of the Pricing of Audit Services for Financial Institutions". http://digitalcommons.trinity.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1023&context=busadmin_faculty
- Giroux, G., and McLelland, A. "A Municipal Audit Fee Model Using Structural Equation Modeling". http://harbert.auburn.edu/~mclelaj/research_files/JABR08.pdf
- Gul, F. A., and Goodwin, J. "Short-Term Debt Maturity Structures, Credit Ratings, and the Pricing of Audit Services". <http://www.aaajournals.org/doi/pdf/10.2308/accr.2010.85.3.877>
- Ireland, J. C., and Lennox, C. S. "The Large Audit Firm Fee Premium: A Case of Selectivity Bias?". <http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/download?doi=10.1.1.466.5926&rep=rep1&type=pdf>
- Korotkyi, V. V., and Petrakov, Ya. V. "Metodolohichni pidkhody kontroliu yakosti audytorskykh posluh v Ukraini" [Methodological approaches of quality control of audit services in Ukraine]. *Visnyk Chernihivskoho derzhavnoho tekhnolohichnoho universytetu*, no. 38 (2009): 189-198.
- Lima, Castro W. et al. "Determinants of Audit Fees: a Study in the Companies Listed on the BM&FBOVESPA, Brazil". http://www.scielo.br/pdf/rcf/v26n69/en_1808-057x-rcf-26-69-00261.pdf
- Lepkha, M. V., and Petrakov, Ya. V. "Kontseptualni pidkhody do klasyfikatsii audytorskykh posluh" [Conceptual approaches to the classification of audit services]. *Visnyk Chernihivskoho derzhavnoho tekhnolohichnoho universytetu*, no. 39 (2009): 265-276.
- Pong, Ch. K., and Whittington, G. "The determinants of audit fees: Some empirical models". *Journal of Business Finance & Accounting*, vol. 21 (8) (1994): 1071-1095.
- Picconi, M., and Reynolds, J. K. "Audit Fee Theory and Estimation: A Consideration of the Logarithmic Audit Fee Model". https://mason.wm.edu/faculty/documents/audit_fee_model_picconi.pdf
- Petrakov, Ya. V. "Teoriia kvazi-konkurentnykh rynkiv ta audyt v Ukraini: problema identyfikatsii" [The theory of quasi-competitive markets and auditing in Ukraine: problem identification]. *Visnyk Chernihivskoho derzhavnoho tekhnolohichnoho universytetu*, no. 68 (2013): 248-258.
- Riadska, V. V. "Analiz rozvytku vzaiemovidnosyn mizh tsinoiu ta yakistiu audytorskykh posluh" [Analysis of the development of the relationship between price and quality audit services]. <http://economic-vistnic.stu.cn.ua/tmp/pdf/1319.pdf>
- Riepe, J., and Stefani, U. "Are Extensive Audits "Good News"? Market Perceptions of Abnormal Audit Fees and Fair Value Disclosures, Ulf Mohrmann". http://www.uni-konstanz.de/FuF/wiwi/workingpaperseries/WP_08-Mohrmann-Riepe-Stefani_2013.pdf
- Raluca, I. "Audit Fee Econometrical Models: An Overview of the Auditing Research Literature". *Annales Universitatis Apulensis Series Oeconomica*, vol. 13 (2) (2011): 378-386.
- Simunic, D. "The Pricing of Audit Services: Theory and Evidence". <http://wlc.gdqy.edu.cn/res/skillsres/resources/2012/04/05/18/38E1C260-622E-4BE0-A260-C2B107218D65.pdf>
- Sundgren, S., and Svanstrom, T. "Audit office size, audit quality and audit pricing: evidence from small and medium-sized enterprises". *Accounting and Business Research*, vol. 43 (1) (2013): 31-55.
- Shulha, S. V., and Petrakov, Ya. V. "Integrated Reporting as Competitive Advantage for Ukrainian Companies: Determinants vs. Biases". *Biznes Inform*, no. 10 (2015): 26-30.
- Thornton, D. B., and Moore, G. "Auditor Choice and Audit Fee Determinants". https://www.researchgate.net/publication/229488198_Auditor_Choice_and_Audit_Fee_Determinants.
- Vieru, M., and Schadewitz, H. "Impact of IFRS transition on audit and non-audit fees: evidence from small and medium-sized listed companies in Finland". https://mpa.ub.uni-muenchen.de/44664/1/MPRA_paper_44664.pdf
- Whisenant, S., Sankaraguruswamy, S., and Raghunandan, K. "Evidence on the Joint Determination of Audit and Non-Audit Fees". *Journal of Accounting Research*, vol. 41, no. 4 (2003): 721-744.